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BARRY BARTON*
A. Introduction
I wish to address the topic of property rights and environmental regulation,
chiefly the land use regulation that takes place when a nile is made in a plan
under the Resource Management Act 1991, the RMA. There has been a lot
written on the topic, but mostly by advocates of property rights and critics of
regulation. I wish to clear out some of the misconceptions and bring some
balance to the debate. My proposition is that it is legal, constitutional,
principled, and ethical to regulate the use of land, Land use regulation cannot
be dismissed if we are to make progress on amenity, natural character,
ecological integrity, biodiversity, and sustainability. Policymakers should
remain undeterred by the possibility that RMA regulation will affect the rights
of property owners. I will not argue that all land use planning and regulation is
done well, nor will I say that they are the only way to solve enviromnental
problems; indeed it would be impossible to agree with either suggestion. I will
simply argue that planning and land use regulation have a proper place in the
scheme of things.
Philip Joseph has asserted that in environmental regulation too little
attention is given to our property rights heritage.2 1-le referred to Magna Carta,
the political philosophy of Locke, public choice theory, and the notion of
regulatory taking that comes from the United States of America. I-Ic concluded
that property rights must not be discounted or undervalued as deserving of
lesser protection than the environment. Likewise, Owen McShane has
maintained that the threat of takings of private property is likely to be
* Professor, School of Law, University of Waikato. I presented an earlier version of this article
at the Annual Conference of the Resource Management Law Association of New Zealand in
Queenstown, 12-15 September 2002. 1 thank Gail Bingharn for her work on references, and
the anonymous reviewer for his or her commerts on the draft.
1 Other contributions that do provide balance have been made by P Cassin, Compensation: An
Exa,nination of the Law Resource Management Law Reform Working Paper 14, Ministry
for the Environment, Wellington, 1988- a close study of the provisions of the Town and
Country Planning Act 1977 and other legislation, with recommendations for reform; 0 W
Bromley, Property Rights and the Environment: NaIu,'al Resource Policy jn Transition
1988; D Grinlin ton, "Property Rights and the Environment" 1996 4 Aust Property L J 41;
D Kirkpatrick "Property Rights - Do You Have Any?" 1997 1 NZJEL 267. Kirkpatrick's
theme was that it is impossible to separate control of the effects of the use of resources from
the property rights in those resources, so that property is a key concept in planning and the
RIvIA inevitably concerns the allocation of resources; we cannot pretend that use controls are
separate 1om property rights.
2 P Joseph, "Property Rights and Environmental Regulation", Resource Management Law
Association Annual Conference, 4-7 October 2001, Wellington.
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detrimental to tile environment.3 He too elaborated on American law,
constitutional law, and public choice theory, and went on to consider the
RMA, in particular the relationship between sections 32 and 85, and provisions
for heritage orders and the like.
Some of these opinions follow the line of essays contributed during visits
to New Zealand by an American writer, Richard Epstein.4 He identified what
regulation is suspect unless accompanied by compensation, drawing naturally
on his country's law. His explanation of the limited ability of government to
come to correct conclusions was based on public choice theory, the
impossibility of the perfect knowledge required to regulate centrally, and the
inevitability of domination of government by private interests and factions. He
maintained that property rights are incapable of fragmentation, so that any
partial weakening of one element of ownership is a taking even if the others
are left unimpaired.
Earlier, Kathleen Ryan5 provided a snore specific contribution by arguing
that the RMA needs to be changed to include a new system to allow
landowners a limited right to claim for compensation. She maintained that
regulators have overindulged in restrictions that diminish land value for
subjective reasons, and need some such incentive not clearly delineated6 to
ensure that the benefits of regulation are greater than the costs. Like others
have, She paid considerable attention to the American experience, but also
considered that of other countries, and examined the existing RMA provisions
carellilly. She accepted that property rights are bounded by legitimate
environmental concerns, but her focus was on tile possibility that unless
something is clone regulators will impose unfair and inefficient limitations on
private uses of land.
In his "Think Piece" on the RMA in l998, McShane's main point on the
matter was that section 85 lets regulation come free to councils, which will
therefore "overcoiume" regulation. In consequence councils seize large
3 C MeShauc "Land Management: Public and T'rivate Costs", Resource Management Law
Association Annual Conl'erence, 47 October 2001, Wellington, reprinted with some changes
as "Resource Management: Public and Private Costs" [20021 NZLJ 27.
4 R A bpstein, Woturol Resource Law. Property Rig/irs and Ta/dogs 1999. Also see P. A
Epstein, Towards a Regulatory Cwisiiiutio,i 2000. Epstein's main work is 7'akings Private
/`ropcrty arid the Power ofEminent Domain 1985.
5 K Ryan, Should the RMA Include a Takings Regime?" 19982 NZJEL 63.
6 In references by 0 McShtinc, "ilie Extent to Which Regulatory Control of Land Use is
Justified under the Resource Management Act", in Land Use Comical umie/er the Resource
Manaymmenri Act "A Think Piece" Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 1998 3839
to an earlier version of Ryan's work, there is a proposed amendment to ss 32 and 85 which
would kIlOC it to be a taking presumably a compensable taking where the owner suffers an
unreasonable burden and the provision does not relate to avoidance of common law nuisance,
or where the control is lhr the purpose ol' the preservation of ecological sos tainabili ty, that
could reasonably be addressed by other means.
7 C MeShane I O8, supra n 6, 30, 37.
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tracts of private land so as to incorporate them into the conservation estate;
land is seized for the public benefit at no cost to the public but at significant
cost to the owner, in situations which have nothing to do with internalising
externalities. He drew on Ryan's work, invoking public choice theory and
arguing that a compulsory takings regime would improve environmental
regulation.
In 2001 the Business Roundtable published Bryce Wilkinson's
Constraining Governtnent Regulation.8 His concern was the extent of costly
and ill-conceived regulations in New Zealand, and he advocated better
regulation. He was candid in saying that New Zealand's rating for freedom
from regulation is quite high;9 and in saying that many of his examples of bad
regulatory practice may not prove robust under closer scrutiny. to He offered a
"Regulatory Responsibility Act" which would require laws and regulations to
comply with a set of regulatory principles that he offers. Like other writers in
this genre, he referred often to Magna Carta, Blackstone, Epstein and other
American constitutional thinking. A section on regulatory takings adopted
Epstein's yardstick for determining whether regulation is a taking.t'
This body of writing challenges environmental and land use regulation, and
seeks to advance the position of property owners. Rights to property are
asserted to be in a position superior to other rights, superior, for example, to a
right to a clean environment. They are asserted to be superior to other values
such as sustainability, ecological integrity, biodiversity, amenity, and
landscape. Land use regulation is held only occasionally to be justifiable, and
compensation is said to be payable in many cases where regulations are
imposed.
B. The Flaws in Arguments that Regulation is Illicit
This criticism of land use regulation and planning has some characteristic
weaknesses. Planning horror stories are cited as standard practice; there is no
attempt at empirical inquiry. American law is cited as if it were New Zealand
law. History and authorities from the past are used selectively. The topic
sometimes slips from the defence of private property to the weakness of public
property rights,'2 or to the special problems of amenity values,'3 or to policies
8 B Wilkinson, Conszraining Government Regulation 2001.
9 Ibid, 44, citing the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal 2001 Index of Economic
Freedom, in which New Zealand scored 2 for freedom from regulation on a scale with I as
the highest level and 5 as the lowest. Eighteen other countries scored 2; only I-long Kong,




12 McShane 2001, supra 11 3, 1.
13 Ryan,supran5,9l.
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of renationalisation. Regulation is glibly linked with Marxism or soviet
communism.14 The equivalent linkage for a libertarian argument might be to a
failed state like Somalia. What regulation is acceptable is not clearly
identified; a close reading indicates that some forms are acceptable, eg
regulatory non-takings, or "tit-for-tat" but they are not well
explained, and are lost amid the criticisms of planning and regulation
generally. When I say that to the critics regulation is illicit, I am attempting to
cope with the rather fluid movement of the argument between what the law is
and what it should be.
1. Argumentsfrom the New Zealand constitution
Joseph argues that "Where the public interest justifies the takin of land for
public purposes, the law imports the right to just compensation." He provides
no authority, and I question what New Zealand authority he could provide,
beyond particular statutes and legislative practice. That my doubts are
grounded seems continued by what another constitutional writer, Sir Geoffrey
Pahuer, says, in the article Joseph cites:'7
it is a recognised principle that the state should not appropriate private property for
a public purpose without just compensation. But in New Zealand, absent any
statutoiy obligation such as that contained in the Public Works Act, it is a principle
that has to be honoured by the executive and by Parliament. It cannot be
implemented by the Courts,
Sir Geoffrey doubts that the principle is a constitutional convention. The
principle or presumption cannot be advanced as strongly as it was a hundred
years ago. Nor can it be maintained to deprive a clearly-worded statute of its
effect. Nor does it convert a principle of narrow construction of legislation into
a positive implication of a right to compensation in the absence of statutory
provision.'8 There is plenty of authority on point.'9 In the Privy Council the
following words have been cited with approval:2t
14 McShane 2001, supran 3,1.
15 Ihid,2.
16 Joseph, supran 2,8.
17 0 Palmer, "Westco Logan vA-G" [2001] NZLJ 163, 168.
18 Thud, 166-67.
19 H w R Wade and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law 8th ed, 2000 84, 88 and 788: "This
presumption does not, however, empower the court to award compensation for administrative
acts authorised by Act of Parliament, unleaa the Act itself so provides." Mc0echan I said in
Weseca Logan v Attorney-General [20011 1 NZLR 40, 63 ". . . Parliament can enact laws
expropriating property without compensation."
20 Government of Malaysia v Selangor Pilot Association [1978] AC 337, 350 PC, per
Viscount Dilhome citing Wright J in France Fenwick & Co yR [1927] 1 KB 459, 467.
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A mere negative prohibition, though it involves interference with an owner's
enjoyment of property, does not, I think, merely because it is obeyed, carry with it
at common law any rightto compensation. A subject cannot at common law claim
compensation merely because he obeys a lawful order of the State.
Writers usually make reference to Magna Carta.2' No one can question the
special place of the Great Charter in English legal history, as part of our own
heritage, and as part of our law, as confirmed by section 31 of the Imperial
Laws Application Act 1988. Scholars have long known that most of its clauses
really had meanings different from those which were afterwards attributed to
them;22 yet even when misinterpreted, such as by Lord Coke in his struggle
with the Stuarts, it has expressed an enormously powerful truth about the
relationship of government with the governed. Yet we must be careful even in
our veneration. The meaning of the promises of 1215 is obscure. Clause 39,
one of the most famous provisions, can be literally translated as :23
No freeman shall be taken or/and imprisoned, or disseised, or exiled, or in any way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him, except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or/and the law of the land.
It was not intended to guarantee a trial by jury; it may have meant quite the
opposite. Freemen, it may be noted, did not include villeins. And whether the
law of the land was meant as an alternative is not clear, although it has long
been understood to mean "due process of law."24 Even on the most literal
meaning, therefore, Magna Carta does not profess to protect a landowner from
an intrusion that is authorised by law. In any event, it has no legal standing
higher than a statute, and the doctrine of implied repeal means that the earlier
provisions will where inconsistent be deemed to have been repealed by the
later ones.25 We must be clear therefore that however significant the original
pact, and however potent its later history, Magna Carta's importance is as a
symbol; it does not give legal grounds for striking down modem legislation
such as the RIvIA.26
21 Joseph, supra n 2; Kirkpatrick, supra n 1, 274; McShane 2001, supra n 3. 4; Wilkinson,
supran 8, 146-47, 162, 164, 165.
22 W Holdsworth, A History of English Law 1903 vol 1, pp 58-63, vol 2, pp 207-2 16; W J V
Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History 2nd ed, 1957 79.
23 Ibid, vol 1, p 59. The original of the key phrase is "nisi per legate iudicium parium suorlim
vel per legem terrae". In the 1297 reissue this was ch 29.
24 Ibid,voll,p61.
25 The reissue of 1225 was entered on the statute roll in 1297 as 25 Edw I: T FT Plucknett,
A Concise History ofthe Convuon Law 1956 23.
26 Show v Commissioner of hi/and Revenue [1999] 3 NZLR 154, 157 CA: Magna Carta and
other English statutes identified in the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 form part of the
law of this country - "They do not, however, constitute supreme law in the sense of a limit
on the New Zealand Parliament's sovereignty."
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As for the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, it does not contain any
protection of property rights. There are provisions against search and seizure,
and in favour of natural justice; but the High Court held in Westco Lagan v
Attorney-General27 that they cannot be extended to deal in a general way with
seizure of property without compensation. Nor can the general proviso of
section 28 that ensures that the Bill of Rights is not read as abrogating or
restricting existing rights or freedoms. Property rights were not given
constitutional protection in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982
on which the New Zealand Bill is largely modelled.
When McShane declares:28
Many councillors and practitioners seem to have persuaded themselves that section
85 supersedes any rights to compensation, and that, provided they claim to be
acting under the RMA, the rights granted under Magna Carta, the Imperial Laws
Application Act 1988, and the New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990, have somehow
been withdrawn.
then I consider that the councillors and practitioners are right and he is not.
Section 85, as we shall see, leaves little room for doubt as a matter of statutory
interpretation; and there is nothing in these constitutional instruments to
support his opinion. When Joseph argues that the text and spirit of Magna
Carta bolster the argument for a takings regime that grants rights to
compensation, the argument is not one of law or constitutional convention, but
a very general one of policy and principle.
2. Argumentsfrom the American Constitution
Most writing in this genre refers to the American law on regulatory takings,
which is a fascinating point of reference, but let us clarify some preliminary
points. American law is not binding in New Zealand; it is persuasive authority
in that a New Zealand judge is not bound to follow it, but may properly draw
on it where it is not in conflict with New Zealand law. The key difference
between the two nations is that the United States has a written Constitution that
prevails over legislation, and in that Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment,
added in 1791, is a specific provision concerning property. Its language is not
unlike Magna Carta: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." The Fourteenth Amendment was added
in 1868: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Most state constitutions have an equivalent of
27 [20011 1 NZLR 40 HC. Palmer, supra n 17, 165, accepts the accuracy of the decision.
28 McShane 2001, supra n 3,5.
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the Fifth Amendment. There is no equivalent in the law of New Zealand. The
American law on it has of course become enormous.29
The Fifth Amendment is easy to apply in cases where private property is
deliberately taken for a public purpose.3° The action involves the public power
of "eminent domain," also referred to as "condemnation." The correct
procedures must be followed, the purpose must be legitimate, and
compensation must be paid. Land use regulation, however, is not so easy; the
public neither seeks legal ownership of the land nor pays any compensation to
the owner. Is a reduction in the value of the land because of regulation a taking
within the scope of the Fifth Amendment? In the early days of land use zoning,
the answer was no. However in 1922 the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal
Co v Mahon3' gave a positive answer. A Pennsylvania statute restricted the
rights of the owner of coal to undermine developed areas if surface subsidence
would result. The Court held that this was a compensable taking of the coal
company's rights. Holmes I, for the majority, conceded that:32
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power.
But he went on to make new law with the now-famous statement:33
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
The American courts have been struggling ever since to say how far is too far.
Four years after Pennsylvania Coal, the US Supreme Court came to
consider land use zoning in Village ofEuclid v Ambler Really Co.34 Land was
zoned residential, reducing its value per acre from $10,000 for industrial to
$2,500. The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the particular zoning
and the theory of land use zoning in general. It left open the possibility that
individual applications of zoning might be rejected as arbitrary or
unreasonable, along the lines of the "too far" test of Pennsylvania Coal. But
land use regulation without compensation could develop as a constitutionally
valid activity of government, even where it affected land use. So too, under
29 R C Platt, Land Use and Society: Geography. Law and Public Policy 1996; R Meltz, D H
Merriam and R M Frank, The Takings Issue: Constitutional Limits on Land Use control and
Environmental Regulation 1999.
30 Much of this account is based on Platt, supra n 29,258.
31 260 US 393 1922.
32 Ibid,413,
33 Ibid,435.
34 272 US 365 1926. By the way, Holmes J voted with the majority. Nectow V City of
Cambridge 277 US 183 1928 showed that zoning could infringe the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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earlier authority, could regulation that protected the community from injurious
use of property, in an analogy with the common law of nuisance, but not
restricted to a historical understanding of nuisance.35 Aesthetics are widely
accepted as a basis for land use control, especially in relation to billboards.36
Historical and architectural controls are equally often found to be valid.37 Even
the most casual visitor to Vermont notices that land use in heritage areas is
controlled with great firmness. New Zealand references to American law are
therefore deficient if they refer to Pennsylvania Coal without also referring to
Euclid and the rest of the law that upholds land use regulation.
The "takings" issue was dormant for many years, without much new
understanding of the issues, but it awoke in a series of Supreme Court cases
between 1978 and 1994. The first of them, Penn Central Transportation Co v
New York City38 is still the most important, in enunciating a balancing test that
recognises the significance of three factors, i the economic impact of the
regulation on the landowner, ii the extent to which the regulation interferes
with distinct investment-backed expectations, and iii the character of the
government action. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have clarified
procedural readiness or ripeness to challenge,39 the relevant parcel on which to
calculate economic impact,4° damages as the remedy available,4' the need for
nexus and proportionality,42 and a per se rule on total regulatory takings,
although with two exceptions of nuisance and underlying concepts of property
law.43 The cases hailed by property rights advocates as paradigm-shifting
victories do indeed confer greater protection on private property, but on any
objective examination, they are also doctrinally cautious and are often lintited
in application.44 If one looks at the overall picture, in the large majority of
35 Mugler v Kansas 123 US 623 1887; Go!dblatt v Town of He,npstead 369 US 590 1962;
and Village ofEuclid, supra n 34, 386.
36 Platt, supra n 29,286.
37 Platt, supra n 29,289; Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 104 1978.
38 438 US 104 1978. Generally, see Meltz et al, supra n 29.
39 Williamson 6'ounly Regional Planning Gommission v Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City 473 US
172 1985
40 Keystone Bituminous C'oal Association v DeBcit edictis 480 US 470 1987.
41 First English Evangelical Lutheran c'hurch of Glendale v County ofLos Angeles 482 US 304
1987.
42 No/lan v Cailfornia Coastal Com,nission 483 US 825 1987; Dolan v City of Tigard 512 US
374 1994.
43 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Gouncil 505 US 1003 1992.
44 Meltz et al, supra n 29, 9, referring to First English, Lucas, Nollan, and Do/nit. Platt, supra
n 29, 264, refers to those cases and Keystone to conclude that since 1987 several Supreme
Court decisions have shown a greater willingness to find that regulatory action has harmed a
landowner in a way that amounts to a taking, and that the state has an obligation to
compensate.
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cases using the Penn Central approach of weighing and balancing factors of
particular significance, the landowner loses.45 State appellate courts show an
increased tendency to uphold land use and environmental regulatory
programs.48 Where some lower court decisions have pushed the boundaries of
regulatory taking into new territory, their importance may lie not so much in
their narrow legal significance but in a politically self-fulfilling perception of a
broadening of the rights of property owners in the face of land use
regulations.47 The most recent Supreme Court cases have revived and
reaffirmed the Penn Central analysis, especially investment-backed
expectations, and have largely disappointed property rights advocates.48
Takings law is the locus of deep ideological divisions, and Supreme Court
decisions have been finely divided between liberal and conservative camps.
The law is often criticised for incoherence, but this is not entirely fair.` In fact
takings law is an effort to balance private and public rights, both of which are
necessary, and which often evolve together over time, in a sequence where a
particular land use initially does not present a problem, then becomes the
subject of private action in nuisance, and then the subject of public
legislation.5° For over a century legislators have taken over the task of refining
and specifying the range of acceptable landowner practices.
The takings litigation of the last twenty years has been strongly pressed by
conservative interests determined to restrain government and to advance the
interests of developers. The legal team of the Reagan White House launched a
vigorous attack on government regulation tlirouh the takings clause. Charles
Fried, Solicitor General for a key period, recalls:
But Attorney General Meese and his young advisers - many drawn from the ranks
of the then fledgling Federalist Societies and often devotees of the extreme
libertarian views of Chicago law professor Richard Epstein - had a specific,
aggressive, and, it seemed to me, quite radical project in mind: to use the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a severe brake upon federal and state regulation
of business and property.
45 Meltz et al, supra n 29,9.
46 Meltz et al, supra a 29, 555.
47 Platt, supra a 29, p 269.
48 Palazzolo v Rhode Jsland 533 US 606 2001 and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 535 US 302 2002. See U M Stein, "Takings in the 21st
Century: Reasonable Investment-Baclced Expectations after Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra"
2002 69 Tenn L Rev 891.
49 Meltz et al, supra n 29, 8.
50 C M Rose, "A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights and the New Takings
Legislation" 1996 53 Washington & Lee L Rev 265; C M Rose, "Property and
Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law" 2000 Utah L Rev 1.
51 C Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution - A Firsthand Account 1991183.
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Inside government, the project involved conservative appointments to the
federal judiciary, alterations to the federal court system and to procedure to
ease takings claims, and advocacy against regulation. Outside, well-funded
conservative forces trained lawyers, litigated takings cases on behalf of
developers, and brought judges to attend all-expenses-paid resort seminars to
discuss libertarian views on secure property rights.52
The chief theorist of the project has been Richard Epstein.53 Epstein
maintains that citizens have a natural right to property, and that government
rights to interfere are limited. Any interference at all must be compensated; if
property can be understood as a bundle of rights, then an effect on any one
stick in the bundle is a taking. Virtually any regulation that diminishes the
value of property must be compensated, as a constitutional requirement. Partial
takings therefore have to be compensated as well as complete ones. The
nuisance exception must be restricted to a narrower and static interpretation of
traditional common law nuisance.54 Regulation must have a more direct
relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be examined.55 Epstein's
ideas fit in well with libertarian politics, but there was much criticism of the
accuracy of his constitutional scholarship; his reshaping of Locke's political
theory, his dismissal of a century of constitutional development, his dismissal
of the historical record of regulation at the time the Constitution was written. I
will not try to review it all. No doubt the criticism from left-wing,
environmentalist, or even centrist sources will be dismissed as mere
partisanship. But perhaps I can indicate the seriousness of the flaws in
Epstein's work by referring to two right-wing American constitutionalists:
Robert Bork, who pronounced the book a powerful work of political theory,
but not convincingly located in the Constitution and not plausibly related to the
original understanding of the takings clause;56 and Charles Fried, who wrote
that Epstein was moved to complete not only the text of the Constitution by
reference to the Lockean spirit, but Locke's text itself.`
We must be careful how we use the American law on regulatory takings.
To understand the body of law as a whole, we must consider the authority - a
preponderance - that supports land use regulation without compensation, as
well as the authority that requires compensation for regulation that goes too
far. Regulatory takings law has been vigorously "talked up" and advanced by
political action. That is not in itself a problem; it happens all the time. But
52 D T Kendall and C P Lord, `The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the
Progress So Far" 1998 25 Boston College Environmental Affairs L Rev 509.
53 Takings: Private Property and the Power ofEminent Domain 1985.
54 Ibid,112.
55 Ibid, 128.
56 RH Boric, The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political Seduction ofthe Law 1990230.
57 C Fried, "Protecting Property - Law and Politics" 1990 13 Harv J L & Public Policy 44,
49.
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knowing about it should help us come down to earth in our comparative legal
analysis. American lawmaking on the subject is much like that in other
jurisdictions, with political action, strategic litigation, judicial activism, split
decisions, inconsistent decisions and unprincipled decisions. There is nothing
inherently superior about this American law. It does not deserve the breathless
admiration that it gets in some of the New Zealand writing on property and
regulation.
3. Argumentsfrom other constitutions
Many other countries have constitutions that contain a clause to protect
property rights. How far they apply to regulatory limitations on property is a
very common question.58 Normally it is said that the state can legitimately
impose restrictions on the use of private property to protect the rights and
interests of others and the public interest, usually without provision for
compensation. Planning, zoning and conservation legislation are common
examples. The distinction between compensated "eminent domain" takings
and "police power" regulation is perhaps the most difficult issue in the whole
field.'9 But constitutions do not generally give the degree of protection against
land use regulation that property rights advocates call for.
In Australia, section 51 xxxi of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth
power to make laws with respect to the acquisition of property on just terms. It
limits Commonwealth power, and protects property, but it does not provide a
right to compensation. It does not have equivalents in the states. It is different
from the American equivalent in guaranteeing freedom from acquisition, not
freedom from taking. Acquisition requires an obtaining of at least some
identifiable benefit or advantage relating to the ownership or use of property,
and ordinarily not merely an extinguishment of rights without the acquisition
of a countervailing benefit.6° The fact that a minister exercises a veto over a
development or activity does not amount to acquisition or vesting of
possession in the Commonwealth.6' Land use regulation does not confer such a
benefit.62 Nor does the achievement of government policy objectives, such as
those for environmental protection.63 In contrast, the removal of the burden of
58 A J van der Walt, C'onstitutional Property Clauses: A Goinparative Analysis 1999.
59 Ibid,15-19.
60 Mutual Pools and St off PEy Ltd v Commonwealth 1994 179 CLR 155; G Griffith and G
Kennett, "Constitutional Protection Against Uncompensated Expropriations of Property"
[1998] AMPLA Yearbook 49; D F Jackson and S Lloyd, "Compulsory Acquisition of
Property" [19981 AMPLA Yearbook 75.
61 Commonwealth v Tasmania Tasmanian Dams Case 1983 158 CLR 1.
62 R v Land Use Planning Review Soard by its delegates Davis and Laugh!inS cx p M F Gas
Ply Ltd 1998Tas Lexis 52,119981 TASSC 131.
63 Tasmanian Dams Case, supra n 61; Gornmonwealth of Australia v WMC Resources Ltd
1998 194 CLR 1.
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a mining tenement over land in a Commonwealth national park has been held
to be the acquisition of a benefit.64
Although Great Britain is like New Zealand in having no written
constitution, a Northern Irish case, Belfast Corporation v O.D. Cars Ltd 65 is
noteworthy for its consideration of constitutional protection of property in the
Government of Ireland Act 1920. The House of Lords held that the right to use
property was not itself property, and town planning restrictions did not amount
to a taking of property. In the ordinary use of language, an authority which
imposes some restriction has not taken that property. "It is clear that such a
diminution of rights can be affected without a cry being raised that Magna
Carta is dethroned or a sacred principle of liberty infringed."66
In Canada, as we have noted, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
does not contain a protection of property rights. However, most of the country
shares the original common law heritage that we do. The presumption against
taking without compensation has altered there into a presumption of
compensation when a taking occurs - a significant shift,67 In. British
Columbia v Tener,68 the owner of property rights in minerals was affected by
park status given to the lands in which his mineral rights lay, after the rights
had been obtained. A park use permit was denied him. He was held to have
been denied the right of access which was central to his rights. The rights had
been transferred to the regulator-expropriator. But even here, this transfer of
rights had to be distinguished from land use zoning:69
This process I have already distinguished from zoning, the b[rload legislative
assignment of land use to land in the community. It is also to be distinguished from
regulation of specific activity on certain land, as for example, the prohibition of
specified manufacturing processes. This type of regulation is akin to zoning except
that it may extend to the entire community . . .. Here, the action taken by the
government was to enhance the value of the public park. The imposition of zoning
regulation and the regulation of activities on lands, fire regulation limits and so on,
add nothing to the value of public property.
Even ifNew Zealand did have a constitutional guarantee of property rights like
that of Australia, Northern Ireland or Canada, environmental regulation of land
use would be common and perfectly legal.
64 Newerest Mining WA Ltd v Commonwealth 1997 190 CLR 513.
65 [1960]AC 490,519.
66 thid, per Lord Simonds, 519.
67 Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen [1979] 1 SCR 721, 88 DLR 3rd 462.
68 11985] 1 SCR 533, 17 DLR 4th 1. The facts in Newerest Mining, supra n 64, were similar.
69 17 DLR 4th 1, 12, per Estey J. The requirement that a taking be a transfer of rights to the
government authority, and not simply a prohibition, derived from older cases: France
Fenwick & Co v The King [192711 KB 458; Ulster Transport Authority v James Brown &
Sons Ltd [1953] NI 79 NICA; Government ofMalaysia v Selangor Pilot Association [19781
AC 337 PC; Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen [1979] 1 SCR 101, 88 DLR 3d 462.
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4. Argumentsfrom political theory
Arguments in defence of private property invoke Locke and Blackstone.7°
Locke contested the claims of the monarch to absolute power, and his writing
is the mainspring of classical liberalism, and the predecessor of the democratic
liberalism that still dominates Western political thought.7' Humans are created
free and equal, and co-operate by virtue of reason. They consent to the
establishment of civil society and of government, entrusting power to its
governors for the benefit of society, on pain, in an extreme situation, of being
replaced by the people. The protection of private property is a key reason for
the development of civil society out of the state of nature: "The great and chief
end of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under
Government, is the Preservation of their Property. To which in the state of
Nature there are many things wanting."72 It is common also to quote the
sentence - "Thirdly, The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part
of his Property without his own consent."73 Thus, property rights advocates
argue, Locke shows that in a liberal democracy property rights are prior to
society, are special, and are immune from state interference. But this is not
what Locke said.74 For one thing, he often uses the term property in a wider
sense than usual: directly before the first of these sentences, he explains that he
includes life, liberty and estates under the general name property.75 Rights to
land are only part of his concept. As for the limitations on the supreme power
of the legislature, a wider reading makes it clear that Locke's concern is with
arbitrary power, especially in taxation, and not with any power whatsoever.
And when he insists on consent, it may be the consent of the individual owner,
or it may be consent through representative politics:76
But still it must be with his own Consent, i.e. the Consent of the Majority, giving it
either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by them.
Although Locke does not explore questions of the representativeness of a
parliamentary majority, his writings do not support an absolute property right
70 Joseph, supra n 2, 3-4, 9-10; Wilkinson, supra n 8, on Blackstone 145-46, 155, 160; on Locke
138
71 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government P Laslett ed, 19881 690.
72 Ibid, II § 124, 350. Individuals in the state of nature acquire as property the goods given to
humanity in common by mixing their labour with them; this aspect of Locke's thought is
considered below.
73 Ibid, II § 138, 360.
74 On the misinterpretation of Locke, see M L Duncan, "Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks:
Land as a Community-Based Resource" 2002 32 Environmental Law 773, n 43 and n 46.
75 Locke, supra n 71,11 §123, 350.
76 Ibid, II § 140, 362.
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immune from legislative action. We can go further in this vein. He opened his
Second Treatise by clarifying his language:77
Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death,
and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property,
and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and
in the defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the
Publick Good.
Similarly, "For in Governments the Laws regulate the right of property, and
the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions."78 These words
are not easy to interpret,79 but are a forbidding obstacle to extreme readings of
Locke on property rights. Finally, relevant to resource management, are
Locke's words against waste: "Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or
destroy"8° and in the state of nature to waste the fruit of the land "offended
against the common Law ofNature".8'
Locke's explanation of property met his need to expound a new theory of
government, and did not state in any detail the conditions under which civil
society could limit individual property rights. But there is enough in what he
wrote to put to rest any suggestion that may be attributed to him that property
rights are free of regulation.
Blackstone is often quoted for his description of property as ". .. that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe" and his statement that "So great moreover is the regard of the law for
private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even
for the general good of the whole community."82 These sentences please the
property rights advocates, and it suits them to portray Blackstone as a legal
eminence who explained property rights to be absolute and invulnerable rights
vested in the individual by the laws of nature and of God, as followed by the
wisdom of the common law. Blackstone `s detractors have denounced him as a
reactionary defender of antiquated law. Neither point of view is entirely right.
Certainly he was an enthusiast for English law as well as an expert,83 but he
77 Ibid, II §3, 268.
78 Ibid, II §50,302.
79 Ibid, introduction by Laslett, 104.
80 Ibid, II §31, 290.
81 Ibid, II §37, 294.
82 W Blackstone, Coinnientaries on the Laws ofEngland John Murray, London, 1857 1765
Book 1,1 125, Book 2,p2.
83 Blackstone introduced the teaching of common law in the universities alongside Roman and
canon law. His synopsis of law was more influential in the United States than it was in
England, largely because it provided a compact overview at a time when legal materials were
scarce.
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was not blind to its defects or the benefits of law reform.84 Nor was he a rights
zealot. He spoke of absolute rights to personal security life, health and
reputation, liberty and private property, but he called them absolute in an odd,
attenuated sense of being available only in a purely hypothetical state of nature
prior to the formation of civil society.85 In civil society, rights are not really
absolute at all. "Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member
of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws and
no farther as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public."86 So too with property rights. Private property as we know it is a civil
institution or human invention, and not a natural right at all: "all property is
derived from society."87 On something as basic as the right of inheritance, he
says "it is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly a political, establishment;
since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor hirnself, was no
natural, but merely a civil, right."88 Property rights are therefore not insulated
from government action, and can be changed without doing injustice to the
individual.89 He esteemed community values as well as individual ones,
speaking often of the general good of the nation or the public, and of duties as
well as rights. Government should leave each individual "master of his own
conduct, except in those points wherein the public good requires some
direction or restraint."90 This is hardly a libertarian manifesto. Blackstone
followed his ringing words on sole and despotic dominion by pondering on the
fragility of entitlements to property rights. He sought to assuage those doubts
with a tale of initial occupancy in a state of nature that developed into
permanent rights that encouraged occupiers to invest their industry, justifying
property on a utilitarian basis, only indirectly from natural law. But it was not
meant as a full theoretical justification, and the author preferred to drop tricky
matters like whether occupancy was by universal consent and plunge into the
thickets of doctrine. And indeed his exposition of doctrine shows how unlikely
it is that he intended his remarks about sole and despotic dominion and
exclusive right to be taken literally.9' A singular unitary concept of property
was not a good description of English property law of his time; most land was
84 A W Alschuler, "Rediscovering Blackstone" 1996 145 U Pa L Rev 1.
85 Ibid. 28. On the shortcomings of Blackstone's religious explanation of absolute rights, see M
Raff, "Onvironmental Obligations and the Western Liberal Property Concept" 1998 22
Meib ULR 657.
86 Blackstone, supra n 82, Book 1, ch 1, p 113.
87 Ibid, Book 1, cli 8, p 294; also Book 1, ch 1, p 125.
88 lbid, Book 2, ch 1, p 10,
89 Alschuler, supra n 84, 30; R P Burns, "Blaclcstone's Theory of `Absolute' Rights of
Property" 1985 54 U Cm L Rev 67, 73-74.
90 Blackstone, supra n 82, l3ook 1, cli I, p 114. See Alschuler, supra n 84, 48. Nor does he show
any particular disapproval of statute law: Burns, supra n 89, 83.
91 C M Rose, "Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety" 1998 108 Yale U 601.
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either in settled tmsts or subject to pre-enclosure manorial rights, both of
which imposed a web of checks and balances on the holders of interests in
land.92 Read properly, Blackstone does not give property rights a special place
against legislative reformulation.
From more modern political theory, property rights advocates often invoke
public choice theory.93 Public choice theory uses economic assumptions and
methods to study political institutions and the pursuit of self-interest in
politics.94 It sees the political process as a "marketplace" where the different
actors - voters, politicians, bureaucrats and agencies, lobbyists, industries, etc
- are seeking only to advance their own private interests. The public interest
is nothing more than the outcome of their interactions - their trading.
Everyone is in it for what they can get. It is therefore hostile to the idea of
regulation in the public interest. The state, the legal system, and regulatory
agencies are simply furthering individual private interests when they profess to
act in the public interest; government is merely a means for individual needs
and aspirations to be pursued.
As a theory of public life, it has its shortcomings. The individual is not
always the appropriate unit of analysis; sometimes it is the group or society. It
is also necessary to inquire into how different private interests or preferences
are formed; shaping the agenda is vital in politics. Nor can politics be
understood without inquiring into how power and influence are distributed
unequally in society. Public choice is therefore subject to limitations in its
ability to explain reality, just as other theories are. It faces competition from
other modern theories of democratic politics, such as developmental
democracy, civic republicanism, and participatory democracy.95 Assertions
that the RMA is not in accordance with public choice theory are not in
themselves persuasive, except to a person wholeheartedly convinced of its
strength.
Even if one were to accept public choice as a theory of political activity, it
does not seem to be able to bear the weight of the argument that it is asked in
relation to the RMA. When McShane uses it to say that RMA regulators have
92 Ibid. As to strict settlements, see A W B Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land
Law 1961 222 on restrictions on use by life tenant "He was liable for waste; thus he was
unable to cut timber, or open new mines, or plough up ancient meadow land" and 224:
"Modern textbooks as well as historical works tend to portray the law of real property as a
body of law which has zealously protected the power of free alienation of land, and the rule
against perpetuities and associated doctrines as an effective curb against attempts to destroy
this power in landowners. It is important to realize that the strict settlement ingeniously
removed the power of free alienation from a large number of the landowners of the country;
it required statutory intervention to restore it to them." As to manorial rights, see H C K
Gonner, Common Land and Inclosure, 2nd ed, 1966.
93 Ryan, supra n 5, 73; Joseph, supra n 2, 13; McShane 2001, supra n 3,8.
94 Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A c'ritical Introduction 1991; McAuslan,
"Public Law and Public Choice" 198851 Mod L Rev 681.
95 D Held, Models ofDemocracy 2nd ed, 1996.
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incentives to over-consume regulation," he argues a proposition deriving from
theory that needs to be verified by empirical inquiry. While it is true that
councils do not have to "buy" the effects they have on landowners, it is
arguable that their use of regulation is strongly constrained by the scrutiny of
the plan-making process, including section 32, by the cost of the plan-making
process, by the possibility of reversal in the Environment Court, and ultimately
by the adverse political reaction of affected voters.
5. Argumentsfrom history
It is sometimes said, or implied, that there is no precedent for
environmental regulation in its intrusion on the rights of property owners, and
it is for that reason unjustifiable. The first answer is one that we will come
back to, and that is to concede that indeed there is more environmental
regulation than in days gone by, but for the very good reason that we are more
tware of environmental problems than our forebears were, and have created
worse problems, So our concerns in society have had to change. The second
oint is that regulation is not a recent phenomenon. Our forebears regulated to
he best of their ability. The form of regulation has changed over the years. In
pre-industrial rural England, for example, the law of the manor was an
elaborate system of regulation and management of resources. In its form it was
largely a matter of property law. But we must be wary of thinking that it was
some "state of nature" Eden before the fall; feudalism, where the manorial
system developed, was anything but a fiee consensual relationship.97 Most of
the population, especially in the country, was unfree. There was no room for
individualism. The use of land in and near the royal forests was closely and
sometimes brutally regulated. Mining in the stannaries of Cornwall and Devon,
the Peak District and on Alston Moor was closely regulated by local courts -
local administrative agencies.'8 The face of England was transformed over a
period of several centuries by enclosure of the manorial commons, and then by
canal and railway companies, in procedures that we might call land use
planning and regulation, and that were compulsorily imposed as far as most of
the smaller landowners were concerned.9' American scholars have found that
the regulation of non-injurious uses of land was very common at the time of
the nation's founding, and that the taking of private property was not
understood to include land use regulation, but only actual expropriations of
private property.'°' A similar inquiry in New Zealand about the continuity of
96 McShane 2001 supra n 3, 8; McShane 1998, Think Piece, supra ii 6, 37.
97 A W B Simpson, supra n 92; J N Claster, The Medieval Experience 300-1400 1982 141.
98 See 0 R Lewis, The Stannaries: A Study of the English Tin Miner 1908; A Raistrick and B
Jennings, A History of Lead Mining in the Pennines 1965; R R Pennington, Slamza/:y Law:
A Histoty of the Mining Law of Cornwall and Devon 1973.
99 Gonner, supra n 92; R W Kostal, Law and English Railway Gapitalisin 1825-1875 1994.
100 W M Treanor, "The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process"
1995 95 Columbia L Rev 782; J F Hart, "Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for
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land use regulation in different forms and for different purposes would be
instructive.
6. Sirnplfied view ofwhat constitutes property rightr
Rarely does property rights advocacy go beyond the virtue of property law, the
estate in fee simple, and the assumption that the owner has full rights to land in
consequence. Property rights are more complicated than that. The property
rights spoken of in Magna Carta, for example, are different from those we
enjoy today. They involved a web of relationships with superiors, inferiors and
fellow users, with little room for absolute independence. Wilkinson speaks of
the desirability of the common law of property, contract and tort and their
ability to secure individuals a high measure of freedom. He offers a series of
tests for a proposed law or regulation that includes "Does it preserve venerable
common law causes of action against harm or remove novel or expanded
definitions of legal harms?"0' This question is nonsense. When does a law
become venerable? And how do we separate out common law from statute?
The fee simple, for example, only became a transferable estate because of a
statute, Quia Emptores, in 1290. In fact it was passed for what we would call
revenue purposes. Are restrictive covenants, much esteemed by the advocates
of non-statutory land use control, venerable? They did not exist before 1848,102
and before 1953 they could not be notified on the Land Transfer register,
which meant that they were ineffective. It is insufficient to describe law as
divided into property-common law-venerable-efficient-individualist and
regulation-statutory-new-inefficient-collectivist. Property rights need more
sophisticated treatment than that.
C. A Better View
Having discussed the flaws in the arguments of the property rights advocates, I
will now offer what I believe is a more rounded and more supportable view of
the issues. The relationship between regulation and property raises some
fundamental questions about society and the individual, so I will not be able to
explore all the issues in detail. I hope I can do enough, however, to show that
regulation has a useful and legitimate place.
Modern Takings Doctrine" 1996 109 Harvard L Rev 1252; J F Hart, "Land Use Law in the
Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause" 2000 Northwestern Univ
LRev 1099.
101 Wilkinson, supra ii 8, 212. For a vigorous criticism see J Allan, "Going to hell in a
handbasket" [2002] NZLJ 335.
102 Tulk v Moxhay 18482 Ph 774, [1843-60] All ER Rep 9 LC. It took statute the Property
Law Amendment Act 1986 to allow positive covenants to be made so as to run with the
land; are they any the less property rights for having a statutory parentage?
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1. The sovereignty of the legislature and the safeguards ofthe law
My starting point is parliamentary sovereignty, as a basic and uncontroversial
principle of New Zealand constitutional law.'°3 As a matter of law there are no
constraints that prevent Parliament from passing a law like the RMA, or one a
good deal more draconian for that matter. Whether it should pass a law with an
effect on property rights is primarily a matter of politics and policy. Our
political arrangements reflect a desire to ensure that this parliamentary
sovereignty is exercised carefully. The mixed-member proportional method of
voting was introduced to promote deliberation in law-making, to reduce the
domination of the legislature by the executive, and to reduce the likelihood that
a government will make law in an arbitrary manner. The same purpose appears
in Parliament's select committee processes, and in the duty of the Attorney-
General to report on consistency of bills with the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990, imposed by section 7 of that Act.
The exercise of parliamentary sovereignty is also constrained by
international forces. International law is engaged when a state fails to pay
compensation for the taking of the assets of the national of another state.104
International investment conventions impose similar obligations. Also
important is the perception of the international investment community of New
Zealand as a place to invest and do business. The effect on governments of this
perception has increased as the forces of globalisation have gathered
strength.'°5 The legislature's concern to reassure international investors of their
security of title appears in the Crown Minerals Act 1991, where elaborate
provisions ensure that rights acquired by oil companies and mineral companies
will be grandparented even at the expense of considerable delay in applying
changed rules and policies to them.
In the law of statutory interpretation we find another form of the desire to
ensure that the sovereignty of Parliament is exercised carefully in respect of
property. The courts do not contradict the intentions of the legislature as
expressed in a statute, but through the process of interpreting statutes and
giving effect to them they can make it more difficult to interfere with
fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus the long-standing presumption against
taking property without compensation, for which Attorney-General v De
Keyser `s Royal Hotel Ltd'°6 is a leading authority, ensures that property will
not be taken as a collateral effect or by subterfuge. Parliament may give
powers to take property, but it must do it openly, and those who promote the
measure must be willing to take the political consequences. A degree of
103 P A Joseph, C'onstitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand 2nd ed, 2001 3.
104 M N Shaw, International Law 4th ed, 1997 573.
105 T Friedman, The Lexus and Olive Tree 1999.
106 [1920] AC 508 HL 542 per Lord Atkinson: "The recognized rule for the construction of
statutes is that, unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be
construed so as to take away the property of a subject without compensation."
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transparency is ensured. Parliament and the courts are not in opposition, but
working in their different spheres to protect private property.
However the presumption against taking is not as strong as it was. As John
Burrows puts it: "Once the Courts were most protective of private property
both real and personal. This protection has, understandably, diminished in the
area of planning and land use legislation: here the public interest in the control
of land use prevails." 107 We will look at the planning and land use cases soon,
and will see there that the presumption does not deprive a clearly-worded
statute of its effect.'°5 We have already noted that the presumption does not
extend to the implication of a compensation requirement in the absence of
statutory provision. The point that Burrows makes is an important one, and it
is a broad one. In the United States, the courts in the late nineteenth century
and the early twentieth centi.uy narrowly construed statutes that derogated
from the common law, in order to limit the reach of statutes protecting workers
and consumers; but this period of aggressive judicial resistance to social and
economic regulation ended in the l930s. 109
The statutory interpretation issue is part of a wider theme in the evolution
of public law. While law in the nineteenth century kept pace with the growth
of the modern administrative state, in the early part of the twentieth century it
fell behind, and failed to come to grips with the mass of new regulatory
legislation.tt° Voices like Lord Hewart railed against the new despotism of the
bureaucracy, suggesting that regulation and delegated legislation subverted the
role of the legislature and were contrary to the rule of the law. The role of
the courts, it was thought, was to curb bureaucratic interference with the
common law. In fact the courts were missing opportunities to deal with
ministerial powers and new regulation. In English and New Zealand
administrative law this "great depression" lasted until the early nineteen
sixties.2 However, it lifted, and administrative law began to grow again. The
courts devised effective principles and remedies to impose controls where
necessary on modem administration. They also came to realise that they have a
role in facilitating regulation as well as containing it. Harlow and Rawlings
described the matter as involving a "red light" and a "green light" approach to
administrative lawt3 The red light approach - Diceyan and liberal - views
administrative law as confined to the judicial control and containment of
107 J F Burrows, Statute Law in New Zealand 3rd ed, 2003221.
108 See discussion of Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622 and Attorney-
General ax rel Mundy v Cunningham [1974] 1 HZLR 737, below n 154 and accompanying
text.
109 C Sunstein, After tile Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatoty Slate 1990 6.
110 H W R Wade and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law 8th ed, 2000 15.
Ill 1-lewart, The New Despotism 1929.
112 Wade and Forsyth, supran 110, 16.
113 C 1-larlow and R Rawlings, Law andAthninistration 1984 35.
384 New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol 20
agency action in order to safeguard individual rights. The green light approach
sees administrative law as public law in a broad sense that recognises the need
for agency action and regulation, and takes heed of the broader political,
social, group and non-legal factors that influence administrators. It therefore
rejects the view that the courts are there simply to contain the executive. It is
now commonplace that the courts in judicial review and statutory
interpretation should seek outcomes that facilitate the just operation of
administration and not obstruct it.
The same shift has occurred in the United States; the traditional model of
administrative law concerned itself with confining regulators to their statutory
jurisdiction and ensuring that they exercised their discretion in the ways that
the legislature had intended. It controlled the intrusion of government into
private affairs; a classically liberal, rule-of-law objective.''4 But it had to
change in order to accommodate the broad discretionary authority vested in
agencies by the New Deal legislation of the l930s. The courts did not attack
that legislation with the traditional kind ofjudicial review, but, reacting in part
to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, made new requirements for
agency fact base, procedures, and reasoning; and made new use of statements
of legislative purpose.
distinguished three different ideologies or purposes in action
in British planning law: to protect private property; to advance the public
interest, for example in slum clearance and sanitation, relying on expert
administrators acting for the common good; and to advance the cause of public
participation for its own sake as a radical or populist cause in participatory
democracy, if necessary against both of the first two ideologies. The point at
which the courts came to accept the second ideology, of advancing the public
interest, if necessary against private property, was Board of Education v
Rice"6 and Local Government Board v Arlidge"7 - an early point in this
process of evolution.
Regulation, including land use regulation, therefore has a long and
onourable place in our legal system. Public law has long recognised the
iecessity and desirability of regulation and delegated legislation."8
2. Thejustffication of regulation
There is another side to the debate other than the legal one, and that is whether,
as a matter of policy, a sphere of activity should be subject to regulation, or
whether the matter should be left free of regulation and subject to the
114 R Stewart, `The Reformation of American Administrative Law" 1975 88 1-Jars' L Rev 1669.
115 P McAuslan, The Ideologies ofPlanning Law 1980.
116 [I9IIIAC 1791-iL.
117 [1915] AC 120 FIL.
118 wade and Forsyth, supra n 110, 839.
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economic forces of the marketplace."9 New Zealand is like many other
countries in having seen enormous debate in the last twenty years on the
proper extent of regulation. Many areas have seen deregulation, but many have
seen more new regulation or re-regulation - utilities, energy, health, and
education for example. Safety is one area where regulation is common - for
food and drugs, vehicles, vehicle and equipment operators, structures, and the
workplace. Monopoly is another area, whether under the Commerce Act 1986
or specialist legislation like the Electricity Act 1992. Professions are regulated,
and so, to some extent, are trades like taxi driving. The stock exchange and
other financial institutions are also regulated to some extent. In some such
cases we notice that regulation can take the form of self-regulation, whether
sanctioned by legislation or not. The Advertising Standards Complaints Board,
for example, does not operate under legislation.
It is possible to say that regulation is unnecessary in such fields if market
forces can operate freely. Properly informed, people are said to be able to
make choices about the level of safety and risk that they are willing to incur.
Monopolies can be said rarely to last long where there are no legal barriers to
entry. However in some cases economic analysis can show that there is a case
for regulation; there may be externalities, monopolies, or information
deficiencies which prevent the normal operation of market forces and lead to
market failure. Ogus puts it: "If, then, `market failure' is accompanied by
`private law failure' . . . , there is on public interest grounds a prima facie case
for regulatory 120 Unless the matter is dealt with in private law,
then regulatory activity is justifiable if it will lead to greater efficiency.
Environmental regulation can be justified because of commons issues, that is
public goods outside the market system eg clean air and water, stable climate,
and amenity; valuation issues, due to the impossibility of putting a monetary
value on environmental amenities; and intergenerational issues, due to the
difficulty of allocating goods and bads over time to different generations.'2'
However the observation that an economic justification can be found for
regulation tends to shift into a policy requirement that one must be found; an
assertion that regulation can only be justified by an economic rationale.
There is no reason to make such a radical shift. Environmental problems
are not always susceptible to economic analysis; the issues often lie in the field
of preference formation. Where we are considering what means to adopt in
order to reach an end, economic forces may well be useful tools. But our
judgment about how to reach that end should not be clouded by an excessively
119 Or "presumably" subject to the economic forces of the marketplace. The lack of regulation
does not imply that there is a market of any kind, and, if there is none, advocacy against
regulation will simply be for a laissez-faire position without any pressure being brought to
bear to change the existing state of affairs.
120 A Ogus, Regulation. Legal Form and Economic Theory 199428.
121 R V Percival and D C Alevizatos eds, Law and the Environment: A Multidisciplinary
Reader 1997 33-35.
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high presumption that economic forces are to be preferred. If regulation has a
better chance of producing the results that we as a community need, then we
should be willing to use it even if no economic rationale can be produced.
Government action is not contingent on proof that market forces are unusable.
We must be alert to the possibility that leaving it to the market is really a
policy to do nothing, because there is no likelihood that market forces will
influence behaviour, because there is no market in operation, or because the
incentives are too low to produce the necessary changes. Daniel Bromley
pointed out that "leave it to the market" prescriptions imply that bargaining
over land use externalities must occur against the backdrop of prevailing
institutional arrangements, but policy prescriptions that involve planning
involve alterations in the prevailing institutional arrangements, 122
In After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State,'23 Cass
Sunstein lays down a detailed defence of government regulation against the
attack on it from neo-liberal ideas that became influential in government in the
l980s and 1990s, in the USA and elsewhere. He points out that the critics of
collective action are seeking fUndamental change. He argues that regulatory
initiatives in fields such as the environment, occupational safety and health or
broadcasting are far superior to an approach that relies solely on private
markets and private ordering. One of his most basic criticisms of reliance on
market outcomes is that they are affected by a range of factors that are morally
arbitrary - supply and demand at ally particular place and time, unequally
distributed opportunities before people became traders at all, existing tastes,
the sheer number of purchasers and sellers, and even the unequal distribution
of skills.'24 There is no good reason for government or society to take these
factors as natural or fixed, or to allow them to be tumed into social and legal
advantages, when it is deciding on the appropriate scope of regulation.
As for the argument from individual liberty or autonomy, that if there is no
harm to others, government ought to respect divergent conceptions of the good
life, he observes that difficulties in coordinating the behaviour of many people,
and problems of collective action, may make private ordering coercive or
unworkable.'25 Government regulation prevents coercion or chaos, and thus
promotes liberty by making it easier for people to do what they want.
Moreover there is more to liberty than the satisfaction of private preferences;
true liberty calls for decisions made in a full awareness of all available
opportunities, with all relevant information and without illegitimate
constraints. Preferences are not exogenous, and legal rules affect preferences.
Law and regulation may protect collective goals and aspirations, rejecting the
choices of private consumers in favour of public values or considered
122 D W Brcmley, supra n 1, 37.
123 C Sunstein, After the Rig/its Revolution: Reconceiving t/e Regi.ilato,y Stale 1990.
124 Ibid, 39.
125 Tbid,36,
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judgments. The protection of such aspirations is a vindication of democracy
and is not an objectionable interference with freedom. As for the argument
from welfare, that people know what is in their own best interests, regulation
often provides the solution to coordination and collective action problems. The
model of two-party contracting is unrealistic where there are many people
involved. Market pressures and sheer numbers may prevent players from
obtaining their preferred solution: for instance littering a park or street, or
polluting the air, may be in everyone's self interest if individual benefits
outweigh individual costs, but if everyone does it then aggregate costs may be
higher. Legal coercion is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of individual
preferences.'26 In the environmental field, regulation is a response to the
problem of irreversibility, where effects on a species, a place, or an artefact,
may be permanent, The effect on future generations is a kind of externality.
Thus Sunstein finds that the modern system of governmental controls -
allowing freedom of contract and private property in general, but rejecting
them in targeted areas - has far more coherence and integrity than is
generally supposed. Regulatory failure, where regulation benefits interest
groups and rent seekers, does occur, but it is not the usual result; much
regulation has been successful.
In Free Markets and Social Justice 127 Sunstein expands on his analysis of
the relationship between markets and law. He is strongly in favour of market
instruments and argues that environmental protection in the United States
should take more advantage of market thinking than it now does.' But his
main objective is to question the assertion of the normative primacy of market
ordering. "Free markets can produce economic inefficiency and worse a great
deal of injustice. Even well-functioning economic markets should not be
identified with freedom itself."29 Market ordering is not the be-all and end-all
of our social arrangements. The achievement of social justice is a higher value
than the protection of free markets; markets are mere instruments to be
evaluated by their effects. "[F]ree markets are a tool, to be used when they
promote human purposes, and to be abandoned when they fail to do so."3°
Another key insight of Sunstein is that markets are inextricably dependent
on law and regulation. Free markets depend for their existence on law; on the
law of property that tells people who owns what, and what that ownership
126 Ibid, 37, 43,
127 1997. Sunstein will smile if he sees what Palmer, supra n 17, 167, and Joseph, supra n 2,
14, have quoted from p 203 of Free Markets and Social Justice. He would not deny for a
moment what he said about the importance of the protection of property rights in encouraging
investment in a nation. But he is likely to say that the quotation does not represent the point
that his book as a whole has to make.
128 Sunstein 1997, supra n 127, 384 and chapters 10, 13-14. Also see p 7.
129 Ibid,4.
130 lbid,7.
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entails, and on the law of contract.'3' A New Zealand example of the
dependence of free markets on law and regulation is the electricity industry.
Mere abolition of statutory monopolies in 1987 and 1992 was insufficient to
bring a competitive market in electricity into being until further legal and
regulatory reforms occurred in 1996 and 1998.132 The New Zealand Stock
Exchange, after years of denial, is waking up to the fact that higher levels of
regulation will produce a better market and bring back investors.
3. Property theory
How far can the institution of property be supported on a sound conceptual
basis in relation to other interests? We have noted the claims from the thought
of Locke and Blackstone. Property is much debated by political theorists and
students of jurisprudence. Property is a particularly public part of a legal
system because the assertion of a property owner is not against one party
bound by a us inter partes, but against the whole world, endorsed by the state.
There are two general kinds of argument to justify the institution of private
property, rights-based arguments and utilitarian arguments.
Jeremy Waldron, who has given the most thorough and influential modern
analysis of the rights-based arguments, describes them as arguments that show
that an individual interest considered in itself is sufficiently important from a
moral point of view to justify holding people to be under a duty to promote
it.'33 Are the individual interests served by the existence of private property so
important from a moral point of view that they justify holding governments to
be under a duty to promote, uphold, and protect property-owning? If they do
not have the level of importance that justifies treating them on the basis of
rights, should they be dealt with in the aggregate in the form of utilitarian
arguments about property institutions?
Waldron examines the differences between the two rights-based
arguments.'34 The theory of Locke, developed in some respects by Robert
Nozick, he describes as a special right; private property is a right that someone
may hold in the same way as he or she may have certain promissory or
contractual rights. A person holds property because of what he or she has done
or what has happened to him or her. To Locke, this was the labour that a
person has mixed with land or a thing. The creator gave the goods of the world
to humanity in common, and in a state of nature there could be no property.
But God intended men and women to survive, and to labour for their
subsistence. Private appropriation is the only way to meet human needs. And
131 Ibid,5.
132 B J Barton, `Governance in the Electricity Industry" [2000] NZLJ 300; B J Barton,
"Responsivc Regulation in the Elcctricity Industry" [2000] NZLJ 347.
133 J Waidron, The Right to Private Property 19881.
134 Waldron concludes that the general right argument is fundamentally different from the
special right argument, and that the two cannot be brought together in a single case.
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when a person mixes labour with the land, he or she acquires the right to it. In
his view, as we have noted, the state exists to protect the right so acquired, and
its action is constrained by that right to property, but that right is itself
constrained by a general right which each person has to the material necessities
for survival. Waidron fmds the details of this approach to be unconvincing. It
is simply not true that private appropriation is necessary, particularly where
land is concerned; it may be the most efficient way, but it is not the only way,
so the argument can hardly support a conclusion of right, as opposed toutility3S The argument about mixing one's labour is incoherent; it cannot be
rescued by "desert" or entitlement to reward, by creation ex nihilo, or by
psychological identification. As for Nozick's version of the special right
theory, the lack of a background general right to subsistence is a fatal flaw.
In contrast, Hegel developed a general right: private property is a right that
all persons have rather in the way that they are supposed to have the right to
free speech or to an elementary education. Its recognition is part and parcel of
respect for them as free moral agents. Waidron finds that although there are
obscurities in the Hegelian approach, it is convincing in developing a general
right out of the connection between respect for property and respect for
persons, in individual self-assertion, mutual recognition, the stability of the
will, and the establishment of a proper sense of prudence and responsibility.
But private property can be so justified only if it can be made available to
every person on whose behalf that argument can be made out36 This is a
central problem. It has a radical distributive implication, and suggests a
contradiction: if property must be available to all, then the rights of property
owners must be limited in order to prevent inequality. But this need not
undermine the very idea of private property; legal systems recognise all sorts
of constraints on the rights of owners. In either case the Lockean theory or the
Hgelian it will always be necessary to constrain property rights by a general
background right of subsistence While this background right is egalitarian,
there is considerable leeway for variations in social policy and economic
distribution. From all this Waldron draws out his chief
The important conclusion, then, is this. Under serious scrutiny, there is no right-
based argument to be found which provides an adequate justification for a society
in which some people have lots of property and many have next to none. The
slogan that property is a human right can be deployed only disingenuously to
legitimitize the massive inequality that we find in modern capitalist countries.
This analysis of rights-based justifications of private property can be
directed at environmental issues as much as distribution issues. The institution
of property can make out a very modest moral claim to require governments to
135 Waldron,supran 133, 137-252.
136 Ibid, 389.
137 Ibid, 5. The rest of this paragraph draws from there also.
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promote it, which leaves it mainly requiring justification from its utility. The
other needs of society such as environmental needs are not subordinated, and
justify constraints on property. In addition, the right to subsistence will often
imply rights of access to resources and rights of protection from environmental
harm.
There has been a resurgence of interest in natural law and rights arguments
for law in the last two or three decades.138 The jurisprudence of America
warms to natural law more than that of Britain or New Zealand, so does much
of the property advocacy.139 The reason is the emphasis on fundamental rights
coming from outside the legal system, directly from natural rights or through
an entrenched constitution. Rights talk is often volatile: to assert something as
a right is inevitably competitive and assertive.'40 Rights, however, are always
subject to limitations and overrides, such as where they clash with other rights.
Your right to use your hands freely does not extend to punching me in the
nose. Your right to property does not extend to keeping me as a slave. Some of
the limitations and overrides of rights to property are inherent in property law
itself.
The utilitarian argument for the institution of private property declares that
property and its laws are a human construct built to suit human needs. Its sole
justification is utility, that is, that human experience shows that it is useful for
the promotion of human happiness. Jeremy Bentham, drawing on David
Hume's work, and arguing against the natural law views he attributed to
Blackstone, held that laws were made by human beings, and should be made,
and reformed, with a view to their consequences. An argument for private
property is a utilitarian one if it shows that property will improve prosperity,
the human condition, or overall welfare. Law and economics theory derives
from utilitarian and positivist thought, in asserting that the common law is best
explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of society.14'
Legal positivism is a close ally of the utilitarian approach in law. It has
been the leading line of legal philosophy for most of the twentieth century. The
writings of H L A Hart epitomise legal positivism, and have greatly influenced
modern mainstream thinking in law. 142 They give the best explanation of how
a legal system works in practice as a system of rules, including primary rules,
secondary rules which determine how those basic primary rules are made, and
a rule of recognition that defines the system constitutionally. Law is confined
to the law enforced by the courts, and moral issues are distinguished from it,
138 A leading example is R Dworkin, TakingRights Seriously 1977.
139 Wilkinson, supra n 8, 61-62, 165, 168. At 126 he condemns the subversive influence on the
rule of law in the last century of the doctrine of legal positivism or legal realism, preferring
law to include some ill-defined meta-law.
140 M A Glendon, Rig/i/s Talk: The Impoverishment ofPolitical Discourse 1991.
141 R A Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw 5th ed, 1998 27.
142 H LA Hart, The Concept ofLaw 1961.
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although that is not to say that they are not relevant. A legal positivist
considers that property is the result of positive legal systems, and that property
could not exist without the law's coercive power. Property and property rights
are dependent on the law, and the law must be analyzed as a human construct
or artifice. Property rights must be evaluated against a utilitarian understanding
of what will promote human happiness. No system of property rights is free
from this scrutiny. No form of property rights is immune from being reshaped
in consequence.
The utilitarian and positivist justification for private property therefore
finds that property rights are justified and entitled to respect for their ability to
contribute to overall welfare, but not on the basis of some exterior natural law.
Property rights are part of the legal system and a human construct. Property
rights must demonstrate a contribution to overall welfare, and are subject to
alteration until they do. There is no reason for property rights to claim a
specially-protected position as against other elements of the legal system, such
as environmental regulation. We should employ whatever combination of
property rights and environmental constraints will advance the overall good.
In consequence, neither of the two main theoretical perspectives, rights and
utility, support the claim that property rights are superior to other interests and
deserving of protection against state action. They do not support the more
sweeping assertions of the sanctity of property rights. There has been an
upsurge of theoretical interest in property in the last twenty years.'43 Some of
the scholarship concurs that property rights cannot be asserted as fundamental
human rights to the exclusion of regulations aimed at preserving public health,
amenities or the environment,144 or suggests serious weaknesses in the
conceptual underpinnings of private property.'45 Other writers point out the
complexities in private property; for example, are people's rights of movement
and expression in an airport concourse, a shopping mall, or a residential estate,
to be controlled purely by the owner's right to exclude trespassers?'46 An
environmental re-appraisal of the institution of property has emerged. 147 The
New Zealand debate about property and regulation will be improved by
143 J R Pennock and J W Chapman eds, Property: Nornos XXII 1980; E F Paul, F D Miller
and J Paul eds, Property Rights 1994; J McLean ed, Property and the Constitution
1999.
144 J Harris, "Is Property a Human Right?" in J McLean ed, supra n 143, 64, 87. Also J Harris
Property and Justice 1996.
145 K Gray, "Property in Thin Air" 199150 CU 252; W N R Lucy and C Mitchell, "Replacing
Private Property: The Case for Stewardship" [1996] CU 566.
146 K Gray and S F Gray, "Private Property and Public Property" in McLean ed, supra n 143,
11.
147 R J Goldstein, "Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and
Ecology into Real Property" 199825 Boston College Env Affairs L Rev 347; M L Duncan,
"Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource" 2002 32
Environmental Law 773.
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drawing on such a wider and more modem range of thinking, rather than on
misreadings of Locke and Blackstone.
4. The nature ofproperty, regulation and other kinds oflaw
Property, regulation and other kinds of law are not always readily
distinguished from each other, and common law and statute are more closely
intertwined than some writers notice. Much property law, for example, is
embodied in legislation. Quia Emptores was mentioned earlier, and notice can
be taken of the Land Transfer Act 1952, which lays down the doctrine of
indefeasibihty of registered title, surely the bedrock of the modem New
Zealand law of real property. Common law principles determine whether an
agreement concerning land is an option or a right of first refusal and whether it
is an interest in land - a right to property, in fact. But statutory rules
determine whether the holder can sustain the caveat which may be essential to
irotecting the right. Other statutory rules determine whether a person can hold
right to property in the nature of an easement in gross without owning a
lominant tenement nearby. Conversely, the common law provides long
3tanding principles of statutory interpretation and statute law that are
indispensable to any functioning system of regulation. The common law can
regulate monopolies if statute does not!45 A rounded view of the relation
between regulation and property requires us to accept that they are mutually-
supportive, co-evolving parts of the same legal system.'49 The rights of the
landowner cannot be determined from one part in disregard of the other.
Equally, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of property and the
particular property right that is subject to regulation. Property rights are not
simple, and their content may vary from one place to another, They vary
through time, as we have noted. Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council is
useful in holding that a decision on regulatory taking requires a "logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate".'5° What is in the
bundle of rights that makes up the property of the owner? Landowners are
constrained in their use of land by the law of nuisance. Property rights
advocates have sometimes argued that nuisance analogies are the only
legitimate kind of land use regulation; but in truth common law on a matter
like nuisance can and does evolve with a view to changing circumstances, and
can be influenced by legislation,'5t which would make the argument rather
circular. However there are other limitations than nuisance. For example, the
148 M Taggart, "Public Utilities and Public Law" in P Joseph ed, Essays on the Constitution
1995 214; P P Craig, "Constitutions, Property and Regulation" [1991] Public Law 538.
Vector Ltd v TranspowerNZ Ltd [1999] 3 NZLR 646 CA held that the Commerce Act 1986
was such a statute.
149 CM Rose 1996 supra n 50.
150 505 US 1003 1992, 1027.
151 Burrows, supra n 107, 369.
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common law limits the rights of the holder of an estate in fee simple by
requiring him or her to allow the uphill neighbour a right of support. Some of
the limitations on property rights are inherent in those rights themselves.
Sometimes it is not easy to tell those inherent limitations apart from externally-
imposed ones.
5. The environmentalprob/em
Serious debate about the environment has been under way only for the last
forty years. Before then, concerns were more particular; urban sanitation and
public health in the mid-nineteenth century, wildlife and wilderness protection
in the late nineteenth century, and so forth. The reason is that environmental
problems were not so serious then. There is much more degradation now
because of the exponential growth of world population since 1650, because of
our use of resources, especially energy resources, and because of the
concomitant technology that allows us to have more impact per person. In
addition, our concern is- greater because we have better knowledge about the
health and ecological damage that is caused by the degradation of the
environment. The environmental problem therefore does not figure in the work
of early thinkers on property rights. The world population at the time that
Locke wrote was about three-quarters of a billion, and at the time of
Blackstone and Bentham, still less than a billion.'52 Now it is six billion. No
wonder that they do not address the environmental problem, it had scarcely
emerged. They were more preoccupied with the relation between property and
the state as a constitutional matter and as a distributional matter. Modern
writers like Waidron have been taken up with like issues rather than the
environment. But what they say about the relationship between property and
other public questions is readily applicable to the environmental problem. The
underlying issue is the place of the institution of property in our social,
political and legal arrangements.
Just as we can understand why early writers did not address the
environmental problem, we can see why we do need to do so now. There are
more of us than ever jostling for place and for peace. There is general
agreement that action is needed to put right damage to the environment and
avoid future damage as best we can. The problems are serious and require
substantial action.
6. The response ofthe RMA
Let us turn to the Resource Management Act 1991 and consider its response to
environmental problems in relation to property rights. We find that it
encourages a wide variety of activities, such as education, information, and
financial incentives, but we are not concerned with them in this inquiry. Our
152 Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat,
The World at Six Billion, ESAJPJWP. 154, 1999, Table 1.
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concern is regulation, primarily rules in district and regional plans on the use
of land. The power of district councils to make such rules is contained in
section 761:
A territorial authority may, include rules in a district plan.
The effect ofrules is chiefly stated in section 9l:
No person may use any land in a manner that contravenes a rule in a district plan or
proposed district plan unless the activity is-
a Expressly allowed by a resource consent granted by the territorial authority
responsible for the plan; or
b An existing use allowed by section 10 or section bA.
This restriction is backed up by the criminal sanctions of section 338 as well as
other enforcement procedures.153 Finally, section 851 avoids the possibility
that these regulatory restrictions are compensable takings of land:
An interest in land shall be deemed not to be taken or injuriously affected by reason
of any provision in a plan unless otherwise provided for in this Act,
The effect of these provisions on property rights is shown in Falkner v
Gisborne District Council, decided by the High Court in 1995. `s" The property
right in question was an unusual one, the right of the owner of a property on
the sea coast to protect it from the inroads of the sea. The owner may erect
groynes or other coastal defences to protect his or her land from erosion. This
right is undeniably one of longstanding in English common law, and it is also
clearly part of New Zealand common law. However the Court observed that
there is nothing in principle to prevent a duty sourced in the Crown's
prerogative power, or an established common law right, from being overridden
or restricted by statute: Attorney-General v Dc Keyser `s Royal Hotel Ltd.'55 A
provision in a statute purporting to restrict or abolish existing rights ought to
be construed strictly; a court should look for express language or necessary
implication in a clear and unambiguous manner. Against this background the
Court turned to the RMA and considered its comprehensive, interrelated
system. Barker J held:'56
153 Jt is not necessary here to go into detail about subdivision s 11, nor the constraints of
purpose, function and matters to be taken into account before a council makes rules in a plan,
nor the making of a rule which requires a resource consent to be obtained for any activity
causing adverse effects not covered by the plan, s 764. The regional equivalent of s 76 is
s 68. The equivalents of s 9 for the restriction of activities that concern regional councils are
ss 93 and 12-15C.
154 [1995] 3 NZLR 622.
155 [1920]AC 508.
156 Falkner, supra n 154, 632. Section 23 was no assistance to protect a right or rule of law
which, upon proper construction of the statute as a whole, would otherwise impliedly be
restricted or abolished.
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The whole thrust of the regime is the regulation and control of the use of land, sea,
and air. There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about this. It is a necessary
implication of such a regime that common law property rights pertaining to the use
of land or sea are to be subject to it..
The effect of all this is simply that, where pre-existing common law rights are
inconsistent with the Act's scheme, those rights will no longer be applicable.
Clearly, a unilateral right to protect one's property from the sea is inconsistent with
the resource consent procedure envisaged by the Act; accordingly, any protection
work proposed by the residents must be subject to that procedure.
[T]here is nothing in the scheme of the Act to suggest that the common law right
cannot be infringed - quite the reverse, The Act is simply not about the
vindication of personal property rights, but about the sustainable management of
resources.
The consequence was that the landowners were obliged to obtain resource
consents before coastal protection works could be built. They faced steady
erosion of the coastal foredunes on which their residences were built, and they
faced a district council which had adopted a policy of "managed retreat," Their
plight was plainly on Barker J's mind. The possibility of compensation was
discussed, not that there was any entitlement under the existing state of the
law, but that the legislature could well pass a law like that of the United
Kingdom. Another interesting possibility was that the common law duty and
right could properly be considered by the consent authority under section
1041i - "[a]ny other matters the consent authority considers relevant and
reasonably necessary to determine the application."
The Court observed that it should approach its interpretative task in a
manner mindful of the legislative background:t57
As has been acknowledged both academically and judicially, the statutory
implementation of integrated planning and environmental regimes represents a clear
policy shift towards a more public model of regulation, based on concepts of social
utility and public interest. Private law notions such as contract, property rights and
personal rights of action have consequently decreased in importance see D A R
Williams, Environmental Law 1980, para 109; Attorney-General, ex rel Munday v
Cunningham [1974] 1 NZLR 737, 741; PioneerAggregates UK Ltd v Secretczy of
Statefor the Environment [1985] AC 132, 140-141.
The utilitarian assumption is clear. Earlier, Barker J had observed, on an old
case that a landowner has the right to protect himself or herself against the
inroads of the sea,'58
It might be said that such an approach manifests a narrow nineteenth century
preoccupation with proprietary rights, out-of-keeping with the more holistic policy
157 Ibid, 631.
1 58 Ibid, 630. The case was R v Commissioners of Sewers for the Levels of Pagham. Sussex
18288 B&C 355, 108 ER 175.
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concerns of sustainability and environmentalism popular today. The policy
underlying the common law perhaps has less force today.
Modem law, then, does not give property priority over environmental
regulation.
Gebbie v Banks Peninsula District Council59 is similar. The landowner
sought to reopen a quarry on his land for greywacke and rhyolite, and argued
that he could do so without a resource consent. It was agreed that he owned
those minerals and could mine them as a common law incident of ownership.
But mining and quarrying are a use of land in terms of section 9, both on an
ordinary reading of the words and in light of the express definition of use in
section 94c as including "excavation, drilling, tunnelling, or other
disturbance of the land". The Act applied to the landowner regardless of his
ownership of the minerals and his common law right to mine them. Although
there is a principle against construing an Act so as to interfere with property,
the intent and meaning of the Act is the final and decisive factor. Likewise
Hall v McDrury'6° held that the common law and statutory right to use a public
road did not override the RMA's provisions for controlling activities which
have adverse effects on the environment, so that an enforcement order could be
pursued against a farmer driving a dairy herd along a road. And New Zealand
Suncern Construction Ltd v Auckland City Council,161 following Falkner,
pointed out that the RMA sets in place a scheme in which the concept of
sustainable management takes priority over private property rights. The cases
tre therefore quite clear that the RMA is intended to constrain property rights.
There was nothing unorthodox about these RMA cases in their approach to
the intention of the legislature; they are part of a line of consistent New
Zealand land use planning cases. Ideal Laundry Ltd v Petone Borough
CounciltSZ held that the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 authorised
prohibitions on land uses, and that words like "make provision" had to be
given such fair, large and liberal construction as would best ensure the
attainment of the objects of town planning. Attorney-General ex rel Mundy v
Cunningham rejected an argument to give the Town and Country Planning Act
1953 a narrow interpretation on the ground that it severely affects common, law
rights and imposes criminal liability. This consideration could not justify
attributing an artificially narrow meaning to the words of the Act:163
159 12000] NZRMA 553 HC.
160 [1996]NZRMAI EC.
161 [1996] NZRMA 411, 425 EC, affirmed by the High Court [1997] NZRMA 419, without
referring to this matter.
162 [1957] NZLR 1038, 1061 CA.
163 11974] 1 NZLR 737, 741. Cf dicta of McCarthy .1 in Clifford v Ashburton Borough Council
[1969] NZLR 927, 943 CA.
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Moreover, in the context of planning legislatioti, which is necessarily concerned
with limiting individual rights in the interests of the community generally or local
sectors of the community, I cannot think that it would be right to adopt the "strict
and cautious" approach for which counsel contends. Interference with private rights
and imposition of criminal liability are certainly points to be weighed in the process
of interpretation, but they cannot be allowed to override the discernible policy of
the legislature or the ordinary meaning of the words.
The interpretation of the RMA and previous legislation is therefore in line with
the trends in public law and statutory interpretation that were described earlier.
A philosophy of interpretation that struggles against constraints of the liberty
of the property owner opposes the clear intention of the RMA. There would
not be much point in the RMA if it did not encompass the possibility of
constraining the use of property. Economic instruments and non-regulatory
means came to the forefront too late in the reform and drafting process to
appear in any significant way in the RMA.'64
7. Safeguards ofproperty rights in the RA'IA
Let us bear in mind the safeguards that are built into the RMA to constrain the
way that the rule-making powers of section 76 and its like are used. The first is
the process for plan-making that is set out in the First Schedule. Consultation,
notification, openness, submissions, hearings, and appeals to the Environment
Court figure very prominently. They are significant constraints on the power of
councils to make rules and other provisions in plans. Citizens, communities
and landowners can participate and express their views about the fairness or
unfairness of proposed plans. Landowner groups like Federated Farmers are
capable users of these procedures. A second safeguard is that final decisions on
plans are made by elected councillors, who are receptive to the views of their
ratepayers, and who generally prefer to be seen to be acting fairly and
reasonably as they go about their work. Many of them wish to get re-elected.
This sensitivity to public opinion supplements the statutory procedures and can
save landowners the time and expense of pursuing the formal options such as
appeals to delete proposals for restrictive rules.
The other two safeguards are sections 32 and 85, which call to be
considered together.165 Section 32 requires a council to consider a set of
matters as it proposes provisions for its plan. Provisions containing rules will
be particularly relevant. Are the provisions necessary in achieving the purpose
of the Act? Are other means possible? What are the reasons for and against the
provisions? How do they look if we evaluate the likely benefits and costs of
the plan? Is the council satisfied that the provisions are necessary and the most
164 0 Palmer, "Sustainability - New Zealand's Resource Management Legislation" in M Ross
and J 0 Saunders eds, Growing De,nands on a Shrinking Heritage: Managing Resource-
Use Conflicts Canadian Institute of Resources Law, Calgary, 1992 408, 425; S Upton,
"Purpose and Principle in the Resource Management Act" 19953 Waikato L Rev 17.
165 I agree with MeShane's 2001 approach to this, supra n 3,5.
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appropriate means? The council must document its work on these matters, and
its success in justifying the provisions of its proposed plan will inevitably
figure in debate in the plan hearings and any reference. Section 32 is a
significant control on the regulatory powers of the council. Section 852
allows a landowner to challenge a provision in a plan if it renders that land
incapable of reasonable use. He or she may do so in a submission during the
regular plan-making process, or by applying for a private plan change under
clause 21 of the First Schedule. An alternative exists under section 853 for
the Environment Court to act where a rule both renders land incapable of
reasonable use and places an unfair and unreasonable burden on any person
having an interest in the land. The test is not an easy one to meet, but it can be
met.
These safeguards mean that the Fable of the Awakening Landowner does
not have a lot to do with reality: "Then the landowner wakes up one day to
find that a proposed plan has been declared that over a third of the farm is a
Significant Natural Area because it is kiwi habitat or similar"t68. The reality is
that such a proposal would not last long. If the SNA is a mistake it will never
stand scrutiny. If it is not, and one third of the farm is indeed significant, then
probably it will have attracted environmental attention and restrictions already,
perhaps under the Forests Act as well as the RJvIA. If not, few knowledgeable
landowners or valuers would overlook the possibility in appraising the
potential of the land for development.
Property rights advocacy makes it sound as if councils are in the habit of
stopping landowners from using their land as they have been accustomed. That
is uncommon, because the real issues is usually change in use - the
development potential of land. Future development raises difficult questions
especially where the future development is distant or speculative. Regulation is
only one of the factors that determine whether land can be developed in a
particular way, and when. Market forces are a major factor, often reflecting
underlying physical changes such as neighbouring development, transport
options, new crops, and new building techniques. Potential use will change,
and both market forces and regulation may play a part in that potential.
The assumption that the RMA reduces land value also needs checking.
Land use regulation often enhances the value of your land because of the
restrictions on what your neighbours can do. It reduces the risk that you will
166 The Environment Court examines the council's work on s 32 matters as part of its
adjudication on the substantive merits of the proposed plan, and not by giving relief against
non-compliance with s 32: Kirkland v Dunedin City Gouncil [2002] 1 NZLR 184 CA.
167 Application by PA Steven 1997 4 ELRNZ 64 EC and Steven v Christchurc/z City Council
[1998] NZRMA 289 EC; K Palmer, "Zoning `Wipeout' and the No Compensation
Principle" 19971 NZJEL 316.
168 McShane 2001 supra n 5,7.
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suffer loss of value from what your neighbour might do.'6° Arguments about
compensation for loss of value must take into account that value may also have
been enhanced by regulation.'70 The RMA does not always reduce rights; in
the case of water, for example, a landowner can obtain much greater rights, for
irrigation or some such purpose, than he or she could have under common law.
And, one might add, without paying for the water. Criticism of the RMA as
intruding on property rights must not be selective.
D. Conclusions
First, let me make clear what I am not saying. I am not saying that all
regulation is good. Some of it is badly done. Practice under the RMA is sorely
in need of improvement.17' I agree that silly things can happen under
regulation; but silly things happen under market forces too.'72 I am not saying
that non-regulatory instruments are ineffective. Many are effective. The
information strategies of reflexive law offer much promise, and so do self
regulation, voluntarism and education and information instruments.173 They are
not a panacea, but nor is regulation. Nor is a panacea to be found in economic
incentive systems such as environmental taxes, tradeable quotas, risk bubbles,
and natural resource development and use trading systems. They are not
always realistic, because, for example, of difficulties in defining workable new
individual property rights, and in initiating trading in a genuine market, but
169 McShane 2001 supra n 5, 2, notes this as "tit for tat" regulation, imposing mutual restraints
for mutual advantage, eg not building within 3 m of the boundary. This regulation he sees as
belonging in the private realm and different from other regulations in a more public realm eg
protection of wetlands and riparian edges. It is not clear whether this distinction can be
sustained; it assumes that regulation of relations between neighbours is somehow by contract,
when it is clearly publicly imposed, and it assumes that other regulation involves no such
consensual advantage, when arguably it does, the only difference being the number of people
involved.
170 The Town-planning Act 1926 provided compensation for land taken or injuriously affected
by a planning scheme, other than by bulk and location requirements: s 29. It also provided
that landowners were liable to pay betterment, "such increase in the value of that property as
is attributable to the approval of a town or regional planning scheme" - s 301. The
landowner could be liable to pay one half of the betterment into a Betterment Fund - ss 30
and 31. In Britain there was a similar procedure for betterment and "worsenment" payments
under the Town and Country Planning Act 1932, but it was dropped in 1947: Ryan, supra n 5,
75. There is probably no case to introduce it in New Zealand, but there is a case for taking the
beneficial effects of land use regulation into account when the owner argues that he or she
has suffered loss because of it.
171 N Ericksen, J Crawford, P Berke, J Dixon, "Plans: The Next Generation. Extracts from a
Report to Government on Resource Management, Plan Quality and Governance"
unpublished seminar paper, New Zealand Planning Institute Conference, March 2001.
172 D W Bromley, supra n 1, 39: "Problems arise when over-zealous commentators claim that
ubiquitous markets will solve all land-use problems, or when self-righteous planners claim to
know best about what should be done."
173 N Gunningham and P Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 1998;
R B Stewart, "A New Generation of Environmental Law?" 2001 29 Capital Univ L Rev 21.
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they show unfulfilled promise in areas such as allocation of water and
allocation of marine space. Nor am I saying that individual landowners must
shoulder unreasonable burdens. Where land has special importance, public
money should be used more to pursue public aims. I am confident that
landowners will not object to the rates or taxes required to pay the most
affected of them for that public benefit. Compensation or relief from a rule
should be available in some cases. I have not reached as far as to identify
which cases; Ryan's work on the point is usethl and further work would be
even more helpful.'74 In a case like Steven v Christchurch City Council'75
where no public agency was willing to put large sums into an old house to
make it habitable, then I agree that the landowner should not be prevented
from demolishing it. Nor do I think the RMA is perfect as is; it has many
deficiencies, and not least in its approach to ownership.
I have argued that it is legal, constitutional, principled, and ethical to
regulate the use of land. This has taken me initially through the arguments of
property rights advocates; 1 have found serious flaws in their arguments from
New Zealand constitutional law and American constitutional law. The same
goes for theft arguments from history and from political theory. Theft
arguments that land use regulation is illegal, unconstitutional or objectionable
are a very selective representation of the true picture. I have sought to round
out the picture, by investigating the constitutional position, the theoretical
justification of regulation, the theoretical justifications of property rights, and
their limits. I will have accomplished something if I have shown that Locke,
Blackstone and Epstein are not irrefutable and are not the only sources of
useful ideas. I have also considered the response of the RMA, both the degree
to which it grants regulatory power and the checks and balances that it imposes
on that power. My coverage is by no means complete, and there is a lot of
room for exploration in further research. Empirical work would be particularly
welcome to inquire into the honor stories, how they got resolved, and how
representative they are. Legal history could help ascertain the extent of land
use regulation at different times in New Zealand's history, and ascertain the
intentions of the legislators and policymakers in drafting the RMA.
Regulation has a leading place in a functional system of enviromnental
management. It is a valid and democratic expression of community aspirations
and decisions. It is effective even though it is often imperfect. The main
alternatives have promise but also serious deficiencies. Regulation will affect
market allocations and property rights; indeed, that is its whole point. There is
no need for surprise when landowners report that there has been an effect. Nor
should the existence of an effect automatically trigger a guilty sense of
obligation to pay compensation. There are cases where compensation, or
voluntary sale or removal of the regulatory burden, appears to be desirable, but
174 Ryan 1998, supran5.
175 [1998] NZRMA 289 BC.
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not in every case where a landowner can find a valuer to say that his or her
land value has dropped. I need go no ulirther; there is plenty of room for a
healthy debate about how regulation should work and how it should relate to
property rights. We have to make our own way here, mindful of history,
mindful of the theoretical insights of all kinds of thinkers, in order to work out
how to address the environmental difficulties that we face.
